This paper estimates the probability distributions of budgets, revenues, returns and profits to G-, PG-, PG13-, and R-rated movies. The distributions are non-Gaussian and show a self-similar stable Paretian form with non-finite variance and non-stationary mean. We stochastically rank these distributions to investigate film critic Michael Medved's argument that Hollywood overproduces R-rated movies. The evidence shows that the industry's critics and its shareholders can agree that Hollywood does make too many trashy movies. The profit distributions have aysmmetric tails which means that Hollywood could trim its "downside" risk while increasing its "upside" possibilities by shifting production dollars out of R-rated movies into G, PG, and even PG13 movies. Stars who are willing to appear in edgy, counterculture R-rated movies for their prestige value may induce an "illusion of expectation" leading a studio to "greenlight" movies that have biased Michael Medved (1992, p. 290) 
Introduction
Film writer Michael Medved (1992) has criticized Hollywood's fascination with R-rated movies on both cultural and economic grounds. From the White House to Main Street, many individuals share his view that Hollywood makes too many trashy movies. His argument goes beyond a cultural and critical judgment; he makes a sophisticated economic argument to the effect that Hollywood is missing a profit opportunity by making too many R-rated movies and too few G-rated movies. He accounts for this neglect of profitability as a search for prestige bestowed by Hollywood insiders on edgy, counter-culture movies. Could the movie portfolio that brings such criticism of Hollywood on the grounds of taste and morals also be costing it money? Could a search for prestige among peers lead Hollywood to neglect its bottom line? This paper shows that Medved is right: there are too many R-rated movies in Hollywood's portfolio. An executive seeking to trim the "downside" risk and increase the "upside" possibilities in a studio's film portfolio could do so by shifting production dollars out of R-rated movies into G, PG, and even PG13 movies. The use of a faulty decision model to evaluate motion picture prospects is identified as the primary cause of this portfolio imbalance. We can't assess the role of a desire for prestige as a cause of the overproduction of R-rated movies, but the evidence does show that stars appear disproportionately often in R-rated movies and that the combination of big budget, star and R-rating may be the worst investment a studio can make.
Putting tastes and morals aside, even a casual look at the evidence does suggest that there are too many R movies compared to G, PG, and PG13 movies. More than half of all the movies released in the past decade are R-rated and only 3 percent are G-rated. About 20 percent are PG-rated, and 25 percent are PG13 rated. Based on the production numbers alone, the R category does seem to be crowded while the G category is almost empty. Medved's evidence suggests that R-rated movies are less successful than G-rated movies: he showed that R films were less than half as likely as PG releases to reach $25 million in domestic box office revenue, and the median gross of PG movies was nearly triple the median gross of R pictures while G pictures earned the highest median gross of all. 1 But, Medved's comparisons do not take budgets or profits into account.
More importantly, they fail to account for risk. Motion pictures are among the riskiest of products; each movie is a "one-off" innovation with highly unpredictable revenues and profits. 2 Unless one accounts for the differing 1 Ravid (1999) showed more formally that G-rated movies earned higher average profit than R-rated movies.
2 Scherer and his coauthors (Scherer, 2000) show that the profit distribution from technological innovations is highly skewed with a Paretian tail. Moreover, they show that a model with exogenous entry (of the sort consistent with Medved's "prestige" hypothesis and an equlibrium that fails the arbitrage condition on returns) and a Gibrat-like process that is similar to the Bose-Einstein process which De Vany and Walls (1997) found to be risks among the rating categories, it is impossible to reach a conclusion that R-rated movies are overproduced. For example, the low median or average return on R-rated movies could just reflect lower risk (if they had lower risk). In addition, median revenue will generally differ from expected revenue. Moreover, expected values may be so heavily influenced by a few blockbuster movies as to misstate prospects. Even the use of mean/variance analysis can be misleading (as we shall show) in motion pictures, so one must look to more basic considerations to assess the prospects of motion pictures.
Fundamentally, until it is released, a motion picture is just an unknown, uncertain prospect in the eye of the producer and in the studio's statistical model. Even the conviction that a movie is a "sure thing" is no more than a belief that its probabilities are skewed toward successful outcomes. So, in order to compare motion pictures as prospects one must compare their probability distributions.
The objectives of this paper are to characterize the uncertainty that movies face by identifying their probability distributions and to bring the right decision tools to the task of evaluating them as economic prospects.
This means that the primary task is to get the statistical model right and when we do that we see that there is little scientific justification for a studio to interfere with the producer's "vision". On the other hand, there is plenty of justification for a studio to be wary of a "pitch" for an R-rated, bigbudget movie that a major creative talent is eager to make. There is also more room than the "numbers" might suggest for hunches and intuition that center the non-quantifiable intangibles of story and character. These points consistent with motion picture revenue dynamics best captures the data. Sornette and Zajdenweber (1999) explicitly model innovation as an α-stable Lévy motion and show that the innovation and international motion picture data follow the stable Paretian law. The distribution of motion picture revenues is highly skewed and its mean is related to its variance. Moreover, the distribution may not have finite moments and so may have neither convergent expected values nor variances (De Vany and Walls, 1999) . The sample mean is unstable and does not converge to the population mean. The distribution of profits is not symmetric-it has a heavier positive than negative tail-so that conventional portfolio choices that reduce variance for a given expected return are dominated by choices that exploit the asymmetry of the tails. 3
Once we establish the correct statistical model by estimating the probability distributions for revenues, budgets, and profits in the four MPA ratings categories-G, PG, PG13, and R-we then rely on the unambiguous ranking concept of stochastic dominance to investigate Medved's hypothesis. One movie (first-degree) stochastically dominates another if it has a higher probability of exceeding the other's revenues for all possible revenue outcomes.
This applies also to budgets, with a reversal of the ranking. With regard to profits, stochastic dominance is more subtle because the distribution has two parts that correspond to profits and losses and the distribution is not symmetrical. Accordingly, we rank the positive and negative parts (tails) of the asymmetrical profit distribution. We show that, as Medved claimed, R-rated movies are dominated by G, PG, and PG13 movies in all three dimensions of revenues, costs, return on production cost, and profits. We also show that there are dramatic differences in risk, budget variability, and profits among the ratings.
A cross-tabulation of the sample of movies is given in Table 1. The table shows the sample of movies disaggregated by year, rating classification, and the presence of a star. From 1985 to 1996, inclusive, Hollywood made 1057 R-rated movies; just 60 G-rated movies were made during that same period.
R-rated movies dominate G-, PG-, and PG13-rated movies and comprise just over half of all the movies made. Of the 2015 movies in the sample, 326 featured stars either in front of the camera or behind it. R-rated movies accounted for 52% of the 1,689 movies that did not feature a star and they accounted for 57% of the movies that did feature a star. The 100 stars of the "A-list" appear in, produce, or direct more often in R-rated movies than in any other rating.
The preponderance of stars in R-rated movies is even greater in highbudget movies. Table 2 documents the distribution of stars over ratings categories by budget. As is evident, stars are present in 45% of R-rated movies with large budgets, a much higher percentage than for any other rating/budget classification. By contrast, they appear in only 30% of high budget PG13 movies, 23% of PG movies, and only 10.5% of G movies. In medium and low budget films, the distribution of stars is similar between PG and PG13 movies. No stars appeared in G-rated medium or low budget movies and they appeared predominately in R-rated movies among lowbudget movies. 4 It is notable that R-rated films-portrayed as attacts on conventional social values and moral-attract a disproportionately large share of Hollywood's on-screen and behind-the-camera stars and this is even more true of high budget R-rated movies. Table 3 shows the mean, standard deviation, median, and upper and lower quantiles for revenues, budgets, and returns in our sample of movies disaggregated by rating category. All monetary magnitudes reported in the table, and in the remainder of the paper, are in constant 1982-4 U.S. dollars.
These data are consistent with Medved's calculations as we shall show in Section 5. But, it is essential to evaluate the probability distributions to consistently rank the ratings. We estimate and rank the distributions of revenues, budgets, returns, and profits in Section 5.
Choosing Among Uncertain Movie Projects: Getting the Statistical Model Right
Movies are uncertain prospects. Before a movie is released only probabilities of outcomes may be known. Even these probabilities may be difficult to ascertain since each movie is unique. When a studio considers a motion picture for its production slate, it is, in effect, evaluating it as a probability distribution over various profit or return outcomes and comparing it to other projects it might choose to produce. How should an executive decide among the many projects which ones to produce? Here we abstract from considerations of story value, character, or originality to focus on the quantifiable economic aspects of the decision. How then should information about the odds of different outcomes be factored into the decision to "greenlight" a movie or to choose the movies that will go into a studio's production portfolio?
Since a motion picture will not incur costs until production begins or earn revenues or profits until it is released, the studio executive must form expectations about these highly uncertain elements of a motion picture as an investment. A first cut at formulating this decision might be making an estimate of the expected budget, box office revenues, and profits given what is known about the movie's "creative elements" such as the screenwriter, director, stars, story line, genre, and rating. But, this first cut would be very incomplete for the error in forecasting the expectation must be taken into account. Two movies having the same forecasted expected return on investment may have very different risks associated with them.
A more sophisticated approach would be to consider the expectation and risk associated with a motion picture. To do this, one must know the probabilities of the different outcomes the movie might realize when it is released.
This means one must know how probability is distributed over different outcomes. A budget, box office, return, or profit outcome for a movie is a random variable X that has a probability distribution P r[
A movie's prospects are given by the probability distributions of its budget, revenues, and return on investment, all of which are random variables.
To make informed decisions, the studio must get the statistical model of these random variables right. This is where the first critical error is often made. A studio might assume that the probability distribution is a normal distribution and use estimates of the mean and variance (or standard deviation) from past movies to form an estimate of the expectation and risk (variance or standard deviation) of a movie's prospects. Using the mean and standard deviation estimated from a sample of movies that have been produced and released, a financial analyst might forecast expected revenues, say, as the mean and use the standard deviation to describe the error of the forecast.
As we show below, this is the wrong model for the movie business. In the movies the average is unstable and does not converge to a stationary value over the course of time. The variance of outcomes increases with the size of the sample. These points are dramatically indicated by Figures 1 and 2 which show the average and variance of box office revenues as the number of movies released increases over time. Both series are volatile and self-similar (segments of the graphs look like the whole graph). 5 Since the average rises and falls randomly and often quite dramatically as the number of movies in the sample increases, an average calculated from a given sample of movies will be a poor forecast of the average in the future. Not only is the average unstable, it is a poor estimator of the expected next event, which is the most probable future outcome. This is because the average is not the most probable outcome. The average is dominated by rare, extreme outcomes and is quite far above the most probable outcome. Because extreme outcomes dominate the average, the expectation will differ from the average and it need not even exist mathematically. The variance is unstable as well; it grows with the number of movies included in the sample. The variance may be unbounded and need not have a finite value (and usually does not).
All these points follow from the nature of the probability distributions that describe the movie business. We shall briefly describe the features of the statistical models that capture the movie business and show that the stable Paretian model is the right model. The stable Paretian model was proposed by Mandelbrot for economic data (Mandelbrot, 1963ab, 1967 and Vany and Lee (De Vany and Lee, 2000) verify that the revenue increments are an α-Stable Lévy Motion whose increments scale as δt 1/α . The process is dense with discontinuities, as McCulloch (McCulloch, 1996) shows is true of an α-Stable Lévy Motion. The discontinuities are quite evident in the figure even though the series shown is a timeexpanding average rather than the raw increments.
by Fama (1963 Fama ( , 1965 for returns to financial assets. 6 The estimates of the parameters of the stable Paretian model are presented below. Here we focus on the contrast between the stable Paretian model and the normal distribution model.
Consider the probability distributions shown in Figure 3 . In this figure the probability density function of box office revenues of all movies in the sample is estimated and overlaid with a normal distribution. The difference is striking: the correct probability distribution is highly skewed and is not symmetrical. Most of the probability is placed on the most frequent, low revenue outcomes. These low outcomes far exceed the frequency predicted by the normal distribution. The correct model has a long, thick tail to the right, showing that the probability of extremely high revenues exceeds what is predicted by the normal distribution model. The mean revenue is much higher than the most probable revenue, which is where the density function reaches its highest level. This is completely different from a normal distribution where the most probable outcome (the peak of the probability density curve) is always equal to the mean. 
Ranking by Success Rates
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that one must compare whole probability distributions rather than averages or expectations and their variance. A simple first test of which movies are better prospects, then, may rely on simple calculations of the probabilities of outcomes. If movie A has a higher probability of "success" than movie B, then A is weakly preferred to B. By using different measures of success we can rank movie prospects in each rating class. 
Box Office Revenue Success Rates
In Table 4 we tabulate the number of movies that earned cumulative boxoffice revenues in excess of $50 million; we term these movies "revenue hits."
The number of R-rated movies that are box-office revenue hits is 68 while there are far fewer revenue hits in the other rating classifications: only 8 Grated movies are hits. A Chi-square test indicates that we can not reject the null hypothesis that the revenue hits in each rating category are independent of the year of theatrical exhibition. In other words, this relationship appears to be independent of the year of release.
However, the number of hits for each rating class should be scaled by the number of movies made in each rating classification each year. Success rates are a more representative measure of revenue earning power than is the number of high grossing films. Table 5 displays the proportion of films in each rating classification, by year, that were revenue hits. The success rate for R-rated movies is just 6%, whereas 13% of G-and PG-rated movies are hits and 10% of PG13 movies are hits. The box-office success rates for all non-R-rated movies (G-, PG-, and PG13) are twice the rate for R-rated movies. Table 6 displays a tabulation of movies by year and rating classification that had box-office revenues in excess of three times the production budget; we refer to these films as "returns hits." Here again, we are using a point on the distribution of outcomes to calculate probability. The table shows that there are about twice as many R-rated returns hits as PG-and PG13-rated returns hits, and about ten times as many R-rated hits as G-rated hits.
Return on Production Cost Success Rates
14 The composition of hits across rating classes is independent of the year of theatrical exhibition according to the standard Chi-squared statistical test for independence of rows and columns (Stuart et al., 1999, pp. 409-412) .
To calculate the success rate of returns hits we must control for the number of films released each year in each rating class. In table 7 we show the success rates for the ratings. Overall, 20% of G-rated films are returns hits in terms of their rate of return on the production budget. 7 The proportion of returns hits is 16% in PG-, 12% in PG13-, and 11% in R-rated films.
These tabulations of rates of box-office and returns hits make clear that the G-, PG-, and PG13-rated films had a higher proportion of hits than R-rated movies at the box office and in returns on production dollars. The number of R-rated successes is high because more of these movies are made (and that may blind decision makers who do not pay attention to the odds), but the success rate of R-rated movies is much less than the success rates of G, PG, and PG13 movies.
Ranking by Stochastic Dominance
The foregoing comparison is informative, but, by focusing on the probabilities of a fixed outcome rather than the whole probability distribution, it does not use all the available information. A more sophisticated comparison is to use the probability distributions (which include probabilities of all outcomes) to rank movie prospects. The relevant criterion in this case is stochastic dominance. 8 Intuitively, the idea behind the stochastic domi-nance ranking is that if probability distribution A has less mass on low value outcomes and more mass on high value outcomes than probability distribution B, then A is preferred to B. This means that for any outcome z the probability that movie A will, say, gross more than z is higher than the probability that movie B will gross more than z. When this holds for all values of z then movie A first-order stochastically dominates movie B. More formally,
(1)
is the cumulative probability density function, first-order stochastic dominance of distribution 
Revenues
The upper panel of Table 3 shows the median, mean, standard deviation, and lower and upper quartiles of box-office revenue in constant 1982-4 U.S.
dollars for the movies in our sample. Mean revenues of G-, PG-and PG13-rated movies dominate mean revenues of R-rated movies. The respective average revenues are $25.8 million, $21.5 million, $19.6 million versus $17.0 million for R-rated movies. The variation is also in favor of non R-rated movies for the standard deviations of non-R-rated movie revenues are greater than the standard deviation of R-rated movie revenues.
The high degree of rightward skew in the distributions (as implied by the stable Paretian model) can be verified by looking at the revenue percentiles.
The percentiles in Table 3 indicate that the probability mass of G-rated movies is skewed far to the right. There in the far tail of the G-rated distribution are a few movies with such prodigious box office revenues that the average revenue even exceeds revenue at the 75th percentile. The other ratings classes do not show this extreme skew, but they are highly skewed to the right nonetheless-their means lie above the median and near the 75th percentile.
As Mandelbrot (Mandelbrot, 1963a) showed, the stable Paretian model implies that the asymptotic distribution function of extreme values is a Pareto distribution. The Pareto cumulative distribution function is
where x ≥ k and k, α > 0.
We have estimated the exponent α of the Pareto distribution by maximum likelihood for the upper tail of the box office revenue distribution. 10
The data are well-fitted by the Pareto distribution-Kolmogorov-Smirnov The estimated values of α for revenues of k ≥ 40 million are shown by rating class in Table 8 . The values of α in all ratings but R lie in the interval 1 ≤ α ≤ 2. These estimates imply that for every rating class but R the expected value of box office revenue is finite but the variance is infinite! Only the R-rated movies have an α value greater than two, implying that the distribution of R-rated movie revenues has less probability mass at high outcomes and a finite variance (this was shown also by the lower standard deviation over the sample of R-rated movies discussed above). The
Pareto revenue distribution of movies in the non-R categories places so much probability on extremely high revenue outcomes that their revenues have infinite variance.
It follows from the estimated values of α that box office revenues of Grated movies are more skewed to the right than are revenues in the other ratings categories. The G distribution, therefore, has a higher probability of extremely high revenue outcomes. This follows from the small value of α for the G-rated revenue distribution relative to other movies (probability in the upper tail declines as x −α so the smaller value of α for the G distribution implies that probability declines less rapidly as revenues move into the upper tail of the G distribution). This property is important for ranking the revenue distributions.
From the formula for the Pareto distribution in equation 3, it follows that the random variable having the smallest value of α puts more probability above every revenue outcome exceeding $40 million. Set z = $40 million.
Denote the cumulative probability distributions of revenues of each rating R[z] . Then from the α values in Table 8 we can succinctly state the relationship as
where ≥ denotes first-order stochastic dominance. In words, G movies dominate PG13 movies which dominate PG movies which dominate R movies.
Using the estimated values of the tail weights, α, we can use the relationship of the expected value to the most probable value for the Pareto distribution to highlight the difference among ratings of the most probable and the expected value. For the Pareto distribution the expectation of revenue conditional on revenue z ≥ $40 million may be written as a function of the tail weight α as
The ratio α/(α−1) is the ratio of the expected value to the most probable value of box office revenue. The most probable value is the peak of the probability density function for each distribution. Since we used a common value of $40 million for the estimates, this is the most probable outcome for box office revenue in each rating. Then the multiple by which the expected value exceeds the most probable value is a direct way to rank the revenue distributions among the ratings. Using the estimated values of α, the ratios of the expected to the most probable value of box office revenues for G, PG13, PG, and R movies respectively are 2.69, 2.51, 2.22, 1.78. R-rated movies rank last.
Production Budgets
Production budgets also face a kind of uncertainty. Each movie has a planned budget, but anecdotal evidence indicates that many, if not most, movies go over budget. There is always a risk that a movie will exceed its planned budget, and there are examples where they go far over budget:
Heaven's Gate, Titanic, Cleopatra. There is no way in our data to judge how the actual production budget compares with the intended budget, but we can still learn something of the variability of budgets by examining the distribution of production budgets. Some of this variability is intended, but some is unintended and is the result of a movie going over the intended budget. Consequently, the variability that we can measure consists of an intended part and an unintended part. By holding rating constant, we control to some extent for the intended part. And by comparing the variability relative to the average we also control for some (unknown) portion of the intended variation.
The middle panel of Table 3 presents the statistics on production budgets; this does not include print or advertising cost. The statistics reveal that R-rated movies are generally cheaper to make than G-rated movies.
The average budget of an R-rated movie is $10.5 million whereas the average budget of a G-, PG-and PG13-rated movie is $11.9, $12.8, and $13.9 million, respectively. PG13 movies were the most expensive movies during our time frame and the highest-budget movie (Waterworld ) also was PG13-rated.
The budgets corresponding to the 25th and 50th percentiles of the Rrated production budgets are less than the budgets associated with these percentiles in the other rating categories. By the 75th percentile, however, R-rated movies budgets are nearly equal to G-rated movie budgets. One reason for this is accounted for by the fact that more stars appear in Rrated than in G-rated movies. High budget R-rated movies are also more likely to feature expensive special effects. On the other hand, G-rated movies have the smallest standard deviation of budget and, by far, the lowest ratio of standard deviation to average budget. This suggests that G-rated movie budgets are easier to control than high-budget star movies. G-rated movies do not have the egocentric stars or technically demanding special effects that R-rated movies must deal with.
A picture of the stochastic dominance rankings of movie ratings by budget can be gotten from Figure 5 . Note that we are now ranking in terms of "unfavorable" events, so it is desirable to have a low probability that a given budget level will be exceeded. Consequently, the inequality in equation 1 is reversed. In the figure the so-called survival probability is shown;
this is the probability that a movie will exceed each budget level. The survival probability is plotted in the figure for each rating class. Except for the very low-budget R-rated movies, G-rated movies are the least expensive to make. This is illustrated in the figure by the fact that the probability that a G-rated movie budget will exceed the amount on the horizontal axis lies below the probabilities that the budgets of other movies will exceed these amounts. The exception to this rule is the very low-budget R movies.
The PG13 movies are more expensive and have more variable budgets than other movies, with the exception of high-budget R-rated movies. The survival probability of PG13 movies is above the others until the R-rated movies cross over the other curves at a budget just below $60 million. With the exception of one PG13 rated movie, R-rated movies become the most expensive movies to make in the above $50 million budget category. The low average budget for R movies primarily is due to the large number of low-budget movies in this rating. As R-rated movies move into the upper budget tier they become more expensive than other movies and their budgets become more variable. This seems to reflect a fact we have already mentioned: high-budget, R-rated films feature a disproportionate number of stars and special effects. In the upper budget categories R-rated movies are first-order stochastically dominated by G, PG, and PG13 movies.
Rates of Return
We now examine rates of return because it is the rate of return that drives investment. We take as a measure of the rate of return the ratio of boxoffice revenue to production budget in each class. This measure is shown in the bottom panel of Table 3 . G-and R-rated movies have nearly equal average rates of return: G-rated movies on average earned box office revenues 2.15 times their production cost; R-rated movies earned 2.14 times their production cost. The PG-and PG13-rated movies have average ratios of revenues to costs of 1.66 and 1.39.
Note how the quantile values compare among movies. At the 25th, 50th
and 75th percentiles the return is greater in G, PG and PG13 than in R movies. This means that for every level of return but the very highest returns all other ratings categories dominate the returns to R-rated movies.
A few extreme returns in the R-rated category pulls the average return in this category to near-equality with the return in G-rated movies and above the average returns in the other categories. The large differences in the standard deviations reflect this dominance in the R category of a few extremely high returns. R-rated movies have a standard deviation that is about five times that of G-rated movies and about eight times that of PG and PG13 movies.
R-rated movies are stochastically dominated by non-R-rated movies in the gross rate of return up to the 75th percentile of the high grossing movies.
Well beyond this point, the R-rated probability distribution crosses the PG and PG13 distributions but is almost everywhere dominated by the G distribution. This situation is depicted graphically in Figure 7 in which we plot the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the gross rate of return each rating category. Only a tiny fraction of R-rated movies make rates of return higher than non-R-rated movies, but this handful of movies earns such high rates of return that they pull the mean R-movie return above PG and PG13 movies but not above the G movies.
R-rated movies account for virtually all of the gross rates of return in excess of 25. But, these high returns are concentrated in low budget movies and the total profit associated with these movies is small. The distribution functions for G-and PG-rated films lie substantially below the distribution functions for PG13 and R-rated movies up to a gross rate of return of about 7. There is, therefore, a higher probability that G and PG movies will earn a gross rate of return greater than 7 compared to R and PG13 movies.
We estimated the probability distributions of returns in each ratings class. In each case, the return distribution is a Pareto distribution. The estimated parameter values are given in Table 9 for all movies. The extreme values of return are overwhelmingly earned by low-budget movies.
But, these low-budget movies earn small aggregate profits and make a negligible contribution to Hollywood's bottom line. To look at returns for films that do contribute large absolute profits, we estimated the α parameters in the rating classes for movies that grossed more than $40 million.
These are reported in Table 10 . Since all the estimates are in 1 ≤ α ≤ 2 the mean is finite and the variance is infinite for all ratings.
Applying first-order stochastic dominance to these values is equivalent to ranking the distributions according to their α values, where a distribution with a lower α dominates one with a higher value. Using the values from Table 10 we obtain the returns ranking
The fitted Pareto distributions are plotted in Figure 6 for each rating category of movie. This figure makes clear that G-, PG-and PG13-rated movies stochastically dominate the R-rated movies over the range of outcomes that makes the most important contribution to profits in the industry.
Profits and Losses
We measure profits as one half of theatrical revenues minus production cost. This is an approximation to "real" profits, which are known only to the producer. One half of theatrical revenues approximates rentals that are paid to the distributor. Certain costs are excluded, such as print, advertising, and distribution costs. North American theatrical revenues do not include world revenues (which are reported in a less complete fashion but are known to also follow the Pareto distribution (Walls, 1998 , Ghosh, 2000 , and Sornette and Zajdenweber, 1999 , and to be correlated with North American revenues); domestic revenues averaged (but what does that mean when the variation among movies is so great?) about 40% of total world revenue from all sources during the time period of our sample. 12 Nor do our revenue figures include video, TV, or ancillary revenues. So, the "profits" we are able to measure with accuracy do not conform to the total profit of a movie. Nonetheless, the profit measure is a good approximation to the North American profitability of a movie. The importance is threefold: (1) the North American theatrical market is the "launching point" for the markets that follow, (2) it is of interest to know the relative profitability of the North American theatrical market to the other markets, and (3) the data are more reliable and more movies are reported which permits us to more accurately identify the correct statistical model (which can then be tested on the other "windows" as in Walls (1997) and Gosh (2000) and Sornette and Zajdenweber (1999) ).
In Tables 11 and 12 we estimate the Pareto exponent α for the upper and lower tails of the profit distribution. 13 In the positive tail of the profits distribution, low α is good because it means there is more probability mass (tail weight) on extreme profits. Consequently, one can stochastically rank the profit tails from low to high α. PG13 movies have the lowest positive tail α, followed by G, PG and then R movies. It is important to note that positive profits have a finite mean and an infinite variance because 1 ≤ α ≤ 2. The infinite variance of profits implys there is no natural upper bound on how much profit a movie might earn. 14 In the positive profits tail, R-rated movies are stochastically dominated by other movies.
In the negative tail of profits (the positive tail of losses) large α is good because then there is less probability mass on the extreme losses. So, in this tail, stochastic dominance is ordered from high to low values of α. We see in Table 12 that the Pareto exponent for losses is largest for G movies, followed by PG, R, and PG13 ratings. Thus, in the loss tail, R-rated movies are dominated by G and PG movies and dominate only PG13 movies. One PG13 movie, "Waterworld", is responsible for the dominance of the R over the PG13 category. Note that all of the α values in the loss tail are greater than 2, implying that both the mean and variance of losses are finite. Losses are bounded below, but positive profits are not. The lower bound on losses is determined by budget spending since you can't lose more than you spend.
There is no upper bound on profits since there is no natural limit to what a movie can earn in box office revenues (De Vany and Walls, 1996) . The positive tail α for high-budget R-rated movies without a star is 1.398 while the negative tail α value is 2.232; the tails are not symmetric. An R-rated high-budget movie without a star has less probability mass in the loss tail (with a finite variance there) and more mass in the profit tail (with infinite variance there) than an R-rated high-budget movie with a star. The conclusion is that putting a star in a high-budget R-rated project gives a thinner tail for positive profits (with a finite variance) and it gives a thicker tail (with infinite variance) on losses. 15
Conclusion
The distributions of motion picture revenues, budgets, returns, and profits and they are a good "fit" with the intuition that a studio executive employs when she or he "greenlights" a movie over the advice of the "bean counters".
The asymmetry of the profit distributions indicate that a studio executive seeking to trim the "downside" risk and increase the "upside" possibilities could do so by shifting production dollars out of R-rated movies into G, PG, and even PG13 movies. A change in portfolio that trims the loss tail and expands the profit tail is the best strategy one could wish for and it is there for the taking. As the portfolio composition is changed the difference in the returns will narrow; in equilibrium, the higher risk R-rated movies should earn a higher return. On the other hand, the skill to produce G-rated movies may be more rare than the skill required of R-rated movies, so the differences we see in revenues, returns, and profits between G-and R-rated movies may reflect a return to the higher skill that may be required of G-rated movies.
Why would Hollywood make too many R-rated movies? Medved argued that there is a strong need for approval among Hollywood producers, executives and stars. In the struggle between art and commerce, commerce has taken a back seat as artists, producers, and even executives attempt to earn insider praise and esteem by making movies that are "audacious, artistic, and unusual and [they show] a disposition to dislike any piece of work that too obviously panders to the public" (Medved, p. 306) .
Our results come tantilizingly close to confirming Medved's hypothesis that R-rated movies are considered to bring the most insider prestige in Hollywood. They are surely consistent with the proposition. If a star champions a "prestige" R-rated movie and is willing to appear in it, his or her "bankability" may get it approved and produced. But this approval brings an overall shift in the positive and negative tails that raises the probabilities of extreme losses and lowers the probabilities of extreme profits. A studio who accepts this inferior prospect is clearly trading profit for something or does not understand the shift to inferior prospects that it is accepting. So, either the choice is conscious and there is a sacrifice of profit for a prestige which is to found only in R-rated movies, or there is no more prestige in R-rated than other movies and the star's willingness to do the movie induces the studio to have a false perception of the odds.
That stars with overwhelming frequency appear in or are creatively involved with high-budget, R-rated movies supports Medved's hypothesis that R-rated movies carry more of the kind of prestige that stars and perhaps even studios are after. 16 If stars seeking prestige champion R-rated movies because they "carry a message" then our results say that the studio would do well to recall Samuel Goldwyn's advice, "If you want to send a message, go see Western Union." And, one could ask, how did the "message" come to be one that so dishonors traditional values and morals and why must it always be delivered in foul language?
It is paradoxical that "scientific" management by the studios may contribute to the overproduction of R-rated movies. If the studio's models are based on the normal distribution, on averages, or on "typical" outcomes then they will create biased expectations. The models will underestimate the probabilities of extreme events that are the very essence of the movie business. The stable Paretian model shows clearly that a belief that one can make accurate predictions of revenues or profits, even if a star is in a movie, is an illusion. In the decision to produce, release, book, or appear in a movie no one can afford to ignore those elements that cannot be quantified-like story and character-because those that can be quantified predict so little and so often mislead. Gross returns are defined as Revenue/Budget. Since rentals are about half of box office gross, an approximate rate of return to the studio is .5*(gross return)-1. The breakeven gross return is 2. Revenue is domestic theatrical revenue only and does not include foreign theatrical revenues or other revenue sources. 
Total | 9 11 13 13 20 17 18 17 11 15 16 16 | 176
To make expected cell frequencies not less than 5, we grouped years into 6 two-year categories and deleted the G rating. The resulting Chi-square(10)=10.622 with a marginal significance level of 0.388. 
Total | 13 7 8 7 8 9 9 10 8 11 10 9 | 9
Note: Percentage success rate calculated as 100 times the ratio of 
---------------+-------------------------------------+------
Note: To make expected cell frequencies not less than 5, we grouped years into 6 two-year categories and deleted the G rating. The resulting Chi-square(10)=6.094 with a marginal significance level of 0.807. 
Total | 27 19 18 14 10 7 11 11 13 11 12 11 | 13 ----------------+-------------------------------------+------Note: Percentage success rate calculated as 100 times the ratio of 
.214 --------+------------------------------------
Notes: The Pareto exponent was estimated by maximum likelihood conditional on a minimum value of 2 for return and 40 million for box-office gross. The KolmogorovSmirnov p-values reported are for the the null hypothesis that the data are consistent with the theoretical Pareto distribution. 
